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Introduction
One of the most interesting deals agreed in principle
within the Brady Plan is the Costa Rican one. Its two
main features are: a) the deal has only the options of
debt/debt service reduction (and not a new money
option) and b) the level of debt/debt service reduction
agreed is very large, being estimated at around two-
thirds of contractual obligations. As regards the latter
point it should be stressed that the deal will bring
Costa Rica no easing of its cash flow in the short run.
because the country has not been servicing its
commercial debt in full for several years. However, the
agreement of such a deal will imply that Costa Rica
has - to an important extent - overcome the serious
debt overhang problem, with which it has been
struggling since 1981. (The Costa Rican debt crisis
started a year earlier than that of the rest of Latin
America!) A major reduction of Costa Rica's debt
overhang - if quickly finalised - should have a
beneficial effect on private sector expectations and
confidence, as the danger arising from disruptions and
continuous negotiations disappears. Costa Rican
senior policy-makers would also see a highly
demanding and time-consuming activity such as
payment debt negotiations disappear from their busy
agenda with more time and energy available for them
to concentrate on national economic management.'
The Background
Costa Rica has several distinctive features which affect
its debt position. It is a small country; therefore,
though its debt is large in proportion to its own
economy (with its per capita ratio amongst the highest
in the world, and with a debt/export ratio that peaked
at around 300 per cent in the mid-1980s), the total sum
of its debt is relatively small for its creditors; therefore,
the potential damage of arrears or even losses on
banks' balance sheets is infinitely smaller than similar
steps taken by Mexico or Brazil. This is one ofthe ways
in which Costa Rica's smallness is advantageous to it.
Furthermore, Costa Rica has other special features. tt
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has a democratic regime (being unique in this sense in
Central America); it neighbours with Nicaragua and
Panama, which implies that the US government had
particular motives to maintain friendly relations.
Costa Rica also has a highly skilled debt bargaining
team. At the same time the Costa Rican government
has implemented fairly successfully an acceptable
adjustment programme; the budget deficit has been
sharply reduced, inflation declined from above 80 per
cent in 1981 to a rate between 10 and 20 per cent in
recent years, the exchange rate has become competitive,
leading to a strong expansion of non-traditional
exports. In the last four years GDP growth has been
relatively good, though per capita GDP is still below
its 1981 level. These features have allowed the Costa
Rican government to obtain valuable concessions
from the international financial institutions. For
example, Costa Rica was the first country in Latin
America to get credit from the IMF (under a stand-by)
while having quite large arrears with the commercial
banks. The diplomatic way in which arrears were
accumulated (without any use of radical rhetoric, and,
on the contrary, with permanent emphasis by the
Costa Rican authorities on their wish to reach an
agreement with the commercial banks) was note-
worthy. Indeed Costa Rica followed the strategy of
'conciliatory default', - or perhaps a more mild form
of 'conciliatory debt arrears' - advocated by people
like Anatole Kaletsky, without shouting it from the
roof-tops. As a result, it was able to continue attracting
fairly significant new flows from bilateral aid agencies
and multilateral agencies while limiting service
payments on its bank debt. Partly also because of the
smallness of its economy, such official flows were not
interrupted as a result of commercial debt arrears.
The fact that Costa Rica was in partial arrears to the
commercial banks led to the sharp decline in the price
of its debt in the secondary market (to a level below
20 per cent since December 1987). In turn this made it
easier for Costa Rica to obtain such a favourable deal
within the Brady context.
The Costa Rica Deal in the Context of the
Brady Plan
The agreement reached between Costa Rica and its
Banks' Advisory Committee in November 1989
covered US$1.5 bn of medium-term bank debt and
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US$325 mn of arrears dating back as far as 1986. As
pointed out, this agreement provides for only two
options: reduction of the debt or of the service
thereon; no provision is made for fresh funds without
a write-down. In essence, this agreement gives the
banks the opportunity to sell their debt back to Costa
Rica at a price of about US$0.16 on the dollar. Banks
choosing to sell 60 per cent or more of their portfolio
will receive an offer to exchange the remainder of the
debt for a 20-year bond (including a 10-year grace
period) at a fixed below-market interest rate of
6.25 per cent. As an incentive for commitments to
undertake large-scale buy-backs, these bonds will
include a renewable guarantee of at least 12 months on
interest payments. In contrast, banks selling less than
60 per cent of their loans will receive longer-term
bonds (25 years, with 15 years grace) at a fixed interest
rate of 6.25 per cent with no such guarantee as that
provided for in the former case.
Arrears in respect of the debt remaining after the
repurchase operation are to be settled by means of a
20 per cent cash payments and the reprogramming of
the balance over 15 years (with no grace period) at
0.81 per cent over Libor. Again, in order to encourage
the banks to undertake large buy-backs, banks selling
60 per cent or more of their portfolio will receive a
renewable guarantee on three years of interest
payments.
The Costa Rican bonds will also contain a contingency
clause whereby the banks will be entitled to additional
payments if Costa Rica's GDP exceeds 120 per cent of
its 1989 level in real terms. However, such additional
payments may under no circumstances be in excess of
4 per cent of the aggregate value of the bonds and the
loans involved in the rescheduling of arrears in
interest. Once these latter loans have been paid, the
ceiling for additional payments will drop to 2 per cent.
As part of this package, Costa Rica will also set up a
debt/equity conversion programme involving a
minimum of US$20 mn per annum for the next five
years.
About US$253 mn will be needed to finance the Costa
Rican agreement, of which over US$100 mn will come
from the World Bank and the IMF in the form of
loans. The remainder is to be obtained from bilateral
sources, such as Japan, Taiwan and the USA.
D. A Brief Assessment
The special features of the country and the negotiating
skill of the Costa Rican authorities have been
combined for this country to get the best deal in the
context of the Brady Plan. Furthermore, the fact that
the country was already in rather substantial arrears
for several years with the commercial banks andthat it
did not insist on new money as part of the package
clearly seems to have contributed to it being able to
negotiate such a large discount on its debt. There are
clear lessons here for other debtors, even though some
account needs to be taken of Costa Rica's special
features, such as its smallness and its geo-political
importance to the US. However, other governments
should also learn from the Costa Rican government
the skill to argue that theirs is a 'special case'.
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